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or over ten years, Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary
Putnam have engaged with M. F. Burnyeat in a di
alectic battle over issues surrounding Aristotle's the
ory of perception. Putnam and Nussbaum argue for
11 a defense of the Aristotelian form-matter view as a happy
alternative to material reductionism on the one hand, Cartesian
dualism on the other-an alternative that has certain similarities
with contemporary functionalism."l Burnyeat argues that the
Putnam/Nussbaum conclusions are false because they fail to
realize that the Aristotelian side of body/soul dualism is not
compatible with modern functionalism. 2 Burnyeat also proposes,
as an alternative to the Putnam/Nussbaum argument, a rival
interpretation, which he suggests is held by John Philoponus,
Thomas Aquinas and Franz Brentano. 3 Putnam and Nussbaum
respond by suggesting "how even the greatest Christian inter
preter of Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas, was led by philosophy
and theodicy together to reject Burnyeat's 'Christian interpreta
tion' and to adopt one that is very close to ours.,,4

F

Two Fundamental Questions
Within this discussion, two major questions must be asked:
1) What does Aristotle mean when he says that in percep
tion, the sense-organ becomes like the thing perceived, is
potentially such as the thing perceived is already, and
receives the form of the thing without matter?
2) On the Burnyeat and Putnam/Nussbaum interpreta
tions how is the esse naturale linked with the esse inten

tionale?
This is important in determining which view is correct,
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because an adequate interpretation must be compatible with the
well known Thomistic axiom borrowed from Aristotle, sensus in
actu est sensibile in actu; i.e., the sense-faculty in operation is
identical with the sense-object in action. Burnyeat argues that
Aristotle's concept of the esse naturale is false and outdated;
therefore Aristotle must be junked." Putnam and Nussbaum
. argue that there need be no intentionality in esse intentionale and
that there can still be an identity between matter and form. In this
paper, I will present the arguments of Putnam and Nussbaum,
5
together with Burnyeat's response. In conclusion, I suggest that
neither the Burnyeat interpretation, nor the Putnam/Nussbaum
account is correct. We must opt for a "middle ground" between
the two analyses.
/I

Burllyeai's Analysis
Burnyeat states that Putnam and Nussbaum claim that
because Aristotle explains the relation of soul to body as a
special case of the relation of form or function to the matter in
6
which it is realized," he is a functionalist. Based on this function
alist framework, Putnam argues that humans are probabilistic
automatons.' What Putnam and Nussbaum claim is that for
perception to take place, it is not necessary that there be a
particular set of physical and psychological limitations, although
there must be some sort. In order to demonstrate this, Putnam and
Nussbaum utilize an account of Aristotle's theory of perception
proposed by Richard Sorabji. The Sorabji account addresses ques
tion number one: What does Aristotle mean when he says that
the sense organ becomes like the thing perceived?
Sorabji's interpretation of Aristotle's taking on form
without matter" is that" the organ of sense quite literally takes on
B
the color or smell perceived." Sorabji's interpretation allows
perception to occur without any particular physical set-up. He
believes that what Aristotle means by perception is that when the
eye sees something red, the eye jelly" actually turns red; when
you smell something, your nose turns "smelly."
Burnyeat's second response to this interpretation is his
9
strongest. He points out that Aristotle goes to great lengths to tell
us that during perception the following occur:
1) The being is affected by the sensible object;
/I
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2) This change is a very special one; and
3) It is not a substantial change (in other words, it is a change
in accidental jorm).10
These changes, Aristotle claims, are actualization of a
potentiality"; perception, on the other hand, is not like this. To
illustrate what this change is, Aristotle provides the following
example. Consider these three cases:
1) A man who has the capacity to learn grammar but has
not yet done so;
2) A man who has learned grammar; and
3) A man who has learned grammar and is currently
using it.
II

A green apple becoming red, is going from (1) to (2); a
potentiality becomes actual. This is a qualitative change, the type
of change 50rabji claims Aristotle refers to. The change involved
in perception however, is like the transition from (2) to (3); this is
a quantitative change. This is Burnyeat's claim. We already pos
sess the capacity to perceive. Actually perceiving is our ability to
use that capacity. The sense organ is not changed, it is realized.
Burnyeat takes the above Aristotelian grammatical expla
nation to reject the 50rabji view. lI For Aristotle, the 1/ causal
agent" of the spedal change is the actual color or smell which is
being perceived, not the perceiver. 12 On that note, I too believe
we can dismiss the 50rabji interpretation. I do not claim that
Burnyeat is correct; however I think his analysis has demon
strated clearly that what Aristotle meant by taking on form
without matter" is not that the eye jelly" turns red.
The question now changes for Bumyeat; if what produces
the perception of red or of middle C is red or middle C, how do
we have an awareness of it?13 What Aristotle says here is that the
sense organ must be natured; i.e., it must be "ready to take on" the
sensible object, like the object of perception must be actual.
Aristotle argues that the organ of touch, the hand or foot, must be
in a mean state in respect to sensible opposites like hot and cold. H
In contrast, Putnam and Nussbaum argue that being "natured" is
not enough; there must be some physical change, such as
/I

/I
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Sorabji's "the eye becoming red." They stress that the esse inten
tionale is not as important as previously suggested, but rather, the
esse naturale is. 111ey claim tha~ an id~ntity ~etwe~n th~ o~iect ~n~
the perceiver's concept is possIble wIthout mtentlOnahty. ThIs IS
what the functionalist position allows, and this is why it is
needed for their argument to hold philosophically. Without func
tionalism, the esse naturale will not provide the sufficient justifica
tion it needs to for their claims: therefore, the esse intentionale will
be invaluable. This principle is not compatible with their argu
ment.
According to Burnyeat, what Aristotle argues is that t,he
hand must be of a certain hardness or softness in order to
perceive something. If your hand were as hard as the surface it
was feeling, you would not notice that it was hard. This problem
does not exist for other sense capacities; for example, the eye is
"colorless" and the ears are "soundless." Therefore, we have a
neutral medium to receive visual and auditory signals. The hand
cannot be "feel-less" or absent of temperature, nor to some
degree hard or soft. Therefore, we might not have any contrast
between the perceiver and the object. Here, Burnyeat points out
that the Sorabji interpretation must distinguish between the hand
and the internal organ of touch, which Aristotle, in these texts,
does not appear to do. 16
According to Burnyeat, we are therefore forced to con
clude that the organ actually becoming like the object is not a
literal change (e.g., the hand becoming warm), but noticing or
realizing, or becoming aware of the warmth. What Aristotle
suggests here appears similar to what Aquinas calls a "spiritual
change/' a becoming aware of a sensible quality in the world. 17 In
other worlds, it is not an actual change, rather, an intentional one.
The Putnam/Nussbaum Response
Before discussing that issue, I must first entertain the
objections to Burnyeat's conclusions proposed by Putnam and
Nussbaum. The first point they raise is that Burnyeat's analysis
rests on evidence obtained from De Anima alone, and while this is
a major text, it is not sufficient to consider as the central text. 18
Putnam and Nussbaum next discuss perception and the
relationship between perceiving and desiring which results in
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animal movement. This is key for the functional interpretation of
Aristotle. They start their analysis in chapter seven of De Moto by
stating several questions and answers that Aristotle ponders in
attempting to reach a conclusion about perception. Aristotle is
interested in why, when an animal knows or realizes an object,
the realization is followed by a bodily movement. He answers his
own question by referring to desire, which sometimes, to be
fulfilled by an animal, requires movement. The question that
follows for Aristotle, is how can a mental process actually set a
physical process in motion? Aristotle again answers his own
question in that these processes are, in themselves, functions of
the body. It is only natural for these processes to cause bodily
movements. Putnam and Nussbaum contend that such changes
permanently cOl~oin perception and other forms of cognitionJ
including desire. 9 However, this is not evidence yet for a com
plete material change, which Putnam and Nussbaum must
demonstrate if their thesis is to hold. It is, however, foreshadow
ing the path they will take to accomplish this. This complements
their overall intentions because it demonstrates that, according to
Aristotle, animal movement and perception denote a type of
20
function.
Puhmm and Nussbaum conclude, "De Moto provides
very powerful evidence that Aristotle conceives of both perceiv
ing and desiring as thoroughly enmattered. Their activity is
accompanied, of necessity, by a transition in matter.,,21 This, they
say, indiscriminately shows that there is a necessary material
change in perception but not necessarily a particular change.
Therefore, the artifact model holds.
Is Aristotle a Functionalist?
Like Burnyeat, I see serious problems with this conclu
sion. The functionalist claims that there is no necessary connec
tion between a psychological state and its material realization.
While there might be a change, it is not a particular change. I
suggest that if we refer to Aristotle's concept of sight, touch, taste
and smell, the functionalist position seems unlikely. As Aristotle
argues, there must be a medium in order for perception to occur.
For sight, the eye must be "clear" and the space between the
object and the knower unobstructed; for hearing, there must be
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air "walled" up in the ear; for taste, the taste buds must be
"clear"; and for touch, the hand must be in a medium state of
temperature." How can one claim that these are not particular
necessary conditions; they certainly are! The functionalist inter
pretation holds that perception can occur in any state. Aristotle
plainly argues that this is not true. Rather, there are ve~ specific
conditions for the eye to see, the ear to hear, and so on. 2 On that
note, it is necessary to discuss:
/I

1) Burnyeat's alternative theory of perception, that held
primarily by John Philoponus, Thomas Aquinas, and
Franz Brentano; and
2)
objections raised by Putnam and Nussbaum to this
posltion.

T?:

According to Burnyeat, Philoponus, Aquinas, and
Brentano believe that during perception, the eye merely becomes
aware" of the color, rather than the eye literally becoming red. If
the Sorabji position holds, then the being affected is the nose,
which turns "smelly," or the eye, which turns red. If the
Thomistic theory of intentionality is true, then the being affected
is already in a cognate state: it is aware of the color, or smell, it is
"natured." What, then, is the point to asking what more there is
to perceivingi it is nothing more than becoming aware of a
senSI'ble qua I'lty.24
In order to illustrate why the alternative theory holds and
the Putnam/Nussbaum/Sorabji one does not, Burnyeat turns to
De Anima (2.12). Here he seeks to answer the question of why
Aristotle's biggest statement about his theory of perception is
illustrated by using Plato's model of the wax block. In doing this,
Aristotle objects to Plato and suggests that perception is aware
ness, "articulated awareness, from the start." 25 In other words,
Plato thought that cognitive life could only be explained in terms
of a thinking soul; Aristotle, on the other hand, holds that all that
is necessary is five separate senses. By using the wax model,
Aristotle also substantiates the two claims that Burnyeat makes.
The first claim is that the"reception of sensible forms is to
be understood in terms of becoming aware of colors, sounds,
smells, and other sensible qualities, not just a physiological
/I
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change in the quality of the organ." For example, if I mark some
wax with a circular ring, the wax does not become circular; rather
it takes on and displays a circle. The circle is not displayed of the
wax but rather in it. The second claim is that "no physiological
change is needed for the eye or the organ of touch to become
27
aware of the appropriate perceptual objects.// This means the
effect on the perceiver is the awareness, nothing else.28 It is this
claim that seems to be in opposition to the Putnam/Nussbaum
thesis because it means that in one sense, an animal's capacity to
29
perceive does not require any explanation.
A Second PutnamfNussbaum Response
Putnam and Nussbaum now responded to Burnyeat's
30
claims. They begin by referring to De Anima (2.1, 412b 4-25),
where they make the following point: Because the soul is the first
actuality of the body, it is not appropriate to ask whether or not
the body and the soul are one. To illustrate this, Aristotle refers to
the wax model, where he claims it is also not appropriate to
inquire whether the wax and the shape are one.
According to Burnyeat's reading, the relationship be
tween the body and the soul is not one like that of the wax and its
shape. Matter is the necessary causal condition for perception to
occur; matter, therefore, merely supplies the means, but is /lot the
31
end. Putnam and Nussbaum however, state that the wax model
is apt.// Aristotle's objection to asking whether the body and
soul are one, is justified. liThe soul is not a thing merely housed in
the body; its doings are the doings of body... the only thing there
32
is, is one natural thing.// What this all means in response to
Bumyeat is the following:
II

1) Perception and desire are mentioned by Aristotle, in De
Sensu I, to be activities of the soul that are known or
perceived in some type of material set-up.
2) Whatever this material set-up may be, it is not com
pletely independent. Furthermore, while this may be ex
plored, as Aristotle himself does in De Moto and the Parva
Naturalia, one must make sure not to slip into conclusions
of total reductionism for a complete explanation.
3) What Putnam and Nussbaum suggest is that even the
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greatest Christian interpreter of Aristotle, St. Thomas
Aquinas, was actually led to dismiss the view that
Burnyeat thinks compatible with Aristotle. Aquinas opted
33
for a position more like theirs.
To demonstrate this, Putnam and Nussbaum offer several
propositions that Aquinas, and any other Christian, philosophi
cally must hold by the fact that they are Christians. If the
Burnyeat position is true, then they cannot consciously contend
that these conditions are possible. The committed Christian
philosophically must accept the following propositions:
1) The soul has such power to allow for a prosperous
afterlife.
2) If the body's capabilities are no\ wholly suited to fit
with the functions of the sout why did God not make
humans less arbitrary and more organic?
3) The resurrection of the body must be possible philo
sophically.
If the soul is removed from the body, which it must be in
the resurrection, and there are not necessary material conditions
for this activity to occur, then this long awaited event will be at
worst a "divine blunder." In fact, Putnam and Nussbaum point
out that while Aquinas did (in his Commentary on De Anima),
claim that the reception of form without matter was as Burnyeat
described, he also held that for perception to occur, there are
necessary material conditions; these changes are alterations in the
sense organ.34 It is difficult to determine exactly where Aquinas'
position fits in. If there are necessary material conditions that
result in the organ's changing, what are they? He is obviously
not compatible with Burnyeat. Nonetheless, the Sorabji position
is not a Thomistic one. We are left to ponder this question and I
suggest that Putnam and Nussbaum do not offer any analysis of
this set of issues.
In the Summa Theologiae, (I, 75, 3), Aquinas writes,

Aristotle insists that. ..sensing and the related oper
ations of the sensitive soul evidently happen to
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gether with some change of the body...and so it is
evident that the sensitive soul has no operation
that is proper to itself; but all the operation of the
sensitive soul is the operation of the com
pound...sensing is not an operation of the soul by
. lf.35
ltse
Putnam and Nussbaum point out that for Aquinas, human per
ception has necessary material conditions; furthermore, thinking
needs phantasms, and phantasms themselves are realized by
some matter. Therefore, both thinking and perceiving are forms
of the human body, and perception is "the act of an activity
embodied or realized in a corporeal organ": thinking, on the
36
other hand, is not. Putnam and Nussbaum suggest that, to this
point they have not succeeded in disproving the alternative
Thomistic position; they have simply shown why it is not their
position.
An Analysis of the PutnamfNussbaum Position
I think it is appropriate to point out that the Putnam/
Nussbaum objections to Burnyeat's rival interpretation are futile
and contain little punch. While Aquinas is certainly a Christian
and a theologian, there is no such indication of his religion in his
theory of perception. If we treat Aquinas as a philosopher when
he writes on philosophical issues, we must refute his philosophi
cal arguments with philosophical analysis, not theological ones.
The issues are now all on the philosophical table. What
are we to do with this? I submit the following conclusions:

1) The Sorabji position seems unlikely.
2) The rival interpretation suggested by Burnyeat will not
hold.
3) The proposed attempt to make Aristotle into a function
alist has not been sufficiently demonstrated.
4) Putnam and Nussbaum have not refuted Burnyeat, and
he has not been able to do so to them.
5) None of the interpretations considered in this analysis
correctly link up the esse naturale and the esse intentionale:
this appears to be a necessary condition for any solution.
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Are we therefore forced to accept Burnyeat's conclusion
and "junk" Aristotle? I do not think that position follows.
Burnyeat's interpretation, I submit, pays too much attention to
the esse naturale; he goes so far that the Aristotelian position we
had when we began our analysis is removed. Putnam and Nuss
baum, on the other hand, devote their time to the esse intentionale;
yet they modify it beyond Aristotle to the point where it seems
that the possibility of intentionality is removed from the
knower's capacity. Sorabji is just plain wrong.
I propose instead that we must look further for a proper
analysis and interpretation. The resolution we seek must contain
many parts, which, while present in parts in the above interpreta
tions, are never united under one roof. A proper and through
solution to Aristotle's theory of perception must contain the
following propositions:
1) Aristotle's taking on form without matter" must be
interpreted somewhere between Burnyeat and Putnam/
Nussbaum/Sorabji. It cannot be a total physical transition
like Sorabji, nor can there be no transition like Burnyeat.
Furthermore, we cannot pay too much attention to the
psychological transition in the capacity like Putnam and
Nussbaum's analysis. We need a middle ground between
the totally physical and totally mental, which appears to
be Aristotle's position. The solution must be balanced
between the two.
2) The esse naturale is equally united with the esse inten
tionale. This means that the object in nature is exactly the
same as the perceived awareness; there must exist an
"identity./I
/I

liThe doctrine of intentionality should not be treated as a
doctrine of the similarity of forms, but as a doch'ine of the identity
37
of forms." In order for this to be possible, equal weight must be
given to both the physical object in the world and the knowing
capacities in the human body. The material aspects must be
considered, along with the physiological and psychological. As
Anthony Kenny once wrote:
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When I think of redness, what makes my thought
to be a thought of redness is the form of redness.
When I think of a horse, similarly, it is the form of
horse which makes the thought be a thought of a
horse and not of a cow .... In the one case it has
esse naturale, existence in nature; in the mind it has
38
a different kind of existence, esse intentionale.
If we find a solution that contains these two main "middle
ground" aspects, then I believe we will have found the right
analysis. Recent attempts to manipulate Aristotelian concepts to
fit into contemporary philosophy of mind discussions fail. As
Aristotle himself once noted, one mistake in the beginning of an
analysis leads to many more in the future. Aristotle is Aristotle,
and we must not forget that. He was writing in a time very unlike
ours, and his concepts and theories must be analyzed in terms of
philosophical realism. He is not a modern philosopher and his
philosophic positions must be treated as such. To find a solution
we must first look back at what Aristotle was really discussing,
how he was talking about it, and most of all, why he was talking
about it. If we can answer these seemingly easy questions, we
will be one step further in discovering how one takes on form
without matter."
II
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"physiological process of taking on the color red, constitutes seeing
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calls the last sentence of De Anima 2.12: "What then is smelling apart
from being affected? Or is smelling just awareness?" (18). Here I ques
tion Sorabji; isn't he making a big jump from something smelly one is
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3 ) as Aristotle suggests, then the eye could not take on smell like the

~an took on grammar but rather that he learned his capacity that he

already had.
;2 This is in opposition to the Putnam and Nussbaum thesis, which deends on Sorabji's account to make the functionalist position possible.
This is where the discussion of esse intentionale and esse naturale
becomes important. Whichever interpretation we accept to be true must
shoW that the esse naturale, the smell of the goat, the red of the apple,
the sweet sugar, is exactly the same as the esse intentionale, the human
perceived concept of the "smelly-ness," the "redness," and the
"sweetness. "
14 Bumyeat, 20.
IS Anthony Kenny would claim that this is impossible. There can be no
"identity" without the esse intentionale and esse naturale. Kenny, An
thony, "Aquinas: Intentionality," in The Legacy of Wittgenstein, An
thony Kenny, ed. Oxford, 1984 .
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and Corruption, are the defining characteristics of the four sublunary
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the human being has a particular blind spot for that particular tempera
ture, diho tou homoios thermou kai psuchrou e sklerou kai malokou
ouk aisthanometha, (De Anima, 424a2-2). Therefore, in the case of
touch it must be not hot, not cold, not soft, nor dry, but rather, both,
presumably in potentiality (De Anima, 424a7-1 0, Sorabji 204). These
facts, Sorabji claims, can be used to support his claim that Bumyeat ob
jects to. First, he says, we must come up with a reason why Aristotle, in
the middle of the De Anima, makes reference to On Generation and
Corruption. Secondly, and most crucially of all, the diho (that is why)
at 424a2 appears to become unintelligible on other interpretations, diho
offers to explain why there is a barrier to perceiving ce11ain tempera
tures (215). Lastly, we must ask the question of why Aristotle says that
the human who is going to perceive two binary opposites such as hot
and cold, white and black, must be potentially both. Whether or not
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these claims refute Bumyeat is questionable. Sorabji later proposes
why this is a "mid-point" in the analysis of Aristotelian perception, but
it is cenainly not the mid-point We are looking for here. 'Vhile they
seem to raise important issues, in tern1S of perception and touch, the
issue has obviously not been fuIly solved. Sorabji must still demon
strate how the heart "hardens."
I"'"
Burynyeat. 21.
Putnam and !'\ussbaum. 27.
ibid. 38.
:0 First. I think it is appropriate to note that there does exist a difference
in "function." Plato brushing his teeth before bed, which he does auto
matically at 9 P~1 every night. is one type of function, while a center
fielder chasing after a fly ball is another. An animal running down prey
is also a function but certainly none of these should be talked about and
compared to the function in perception. The word "function" can be
applied to many situations and it is ridiculous to use them all in the
same context. Secondly. Putnam and Nussbaum then refer to De Moto,
\vhere the above position is stated (701 b2-32). They refer to one of
Aristotle's metaphors where he compares animals to automatic puppets
and also to a toy cart. His main point is that even a small change in a
central part of an automaton can bring about a large change in other
parts. '\That this suggests, according to Putnam and Nussbaum, is that
"the animal moves as it does because of the fact that its psychological
processes are realized in physiological transitions that set up move
ments that culminate in fully-fledged local movement" (38). This, they
claim, is why Aristotle is truly a functionalist. In this passage, Aristotle
uses the word alloiosis, which they believe can be translated as
"material transition." Therefore, this material transition is a necessary
condition for perceiving, imagining, and even desire (40). They con
clude from this that material change is intrinsic to what goes on when
perceiving takes place, and this is necessary for a fun explanation of
animal movement. Bumyeat'sanalysis has problems here, although
they are not fatal. He cannot deny that the alloioseis is a material tran
sition without making the entire contents of chapters 7-10 ambiguous
to the point of hopelessness; nor can he disagree that this interpretation
is consistent \\'ith De Allima in that perception is an energy, and Aristo
tle's general non-reductionism in regard to animal motion. All
Burnyeat can do here is to suggest that the material transition is not as
sociated with all perceiving but only certain instances.
- Putnam and Nussbaum, 1992,41.
22 Burnyeat's interpretation can get around this problem because he
claims that physiological necessary conditions are only states of recep
~I
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tivity, not processes or alterations. As Marc Cohen writes "This
clinches his case against the functionalist interpretation, Burnyeat
thinks. For it shows that Aristotle would have to hold that an organ
ism's perceptual capacities are fundamental, not supervenient."
(Sorabji even agrees with this point, see 217.) I too believe that this
clinches Bumyeat's argument against the functionalist; however, like
Cohen, I am not claiming his rival interpretation is correct.
23 Bumyeat, 18.

Ibid.
Ibid.
26 Ibid, 21-2
27 Ibid.
2S Ibid.
24
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For Aristotle, the existence of life is the explanation for why we have
the physical make-up that we have, not vice versa. The secondary qual
ities (proper and common sensibles) are already present in the world;
all that is needed to perceive them is the corresponding capacities to do
so; i.e., the smell of a pig is already in the world; all we need is a nose
to smell it. From this, he argues that we can derive conclusions about
the organs we must have to do this; i.e. the eye must be clear and trans
parent, and the hand must have middle ground of hot and cold to per
ceive temperature. These are only the necessary conditions for percep
tion to take place; they are not part of a more complex story to work up
"from material tel111S to a set of sufficient conditions for the perception
ofcolol's and temperature" (Bumyeat, 22). According to Aristotle'S
view, via BUl11yeat, there is no more story to be told, whereas the func
tionalist position asserts that there is one, but we are just not in a posi
tion to tell it.
3D In summary, they are as follows:
1) For an animal to perceive something, the "reception of sen
sible forms is to be understood in terms of becoming aware of
colors, sound, smells, and other sensible qualities, not just a
physiological change in quality in the organ" (Burnyeat, 21-2)
2) No physiological change is needed for the eye or the organ
of touch to become aware ofthe appropriate perceptual objects.
3) The Sorabji position is false, and what Aristotle really means
by perception is the same as what Philoponus, Aquinas, and
Brentano suggest. Rather than the eye literally becoming red,
when trying to perceive it, the eye merely just becomes aware
of the color.
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Ibid, 45.
Ibid.
33 Ibid, 52.
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David Tulkin
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Ibid, 53.
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36 Ibid.
37 Kenny, 1984,86.
38 Ibid, 82-3.
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